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HE LATE A. D. LINDSAY, eminent British socialist, Labour peer, and for
many years Master of Balliol College, was once described by Ernest Barker as
a &dquo;Puritan prophet of democracy.&dquo; 1 David Easton, on the other hand,
charged him with being an &dquo;historicist&dquo; whose theory served chiefly to explain the
past and said little about the present.2 An anonymous English reviewer argued that
Lindsay presented an incomplete theory that in some respects bore comparison with
England’s &dquo;strictly aristocratic regime of the eighteenth century.&dquo; 3 Yet W. Y. Elliott
ranked Lindsay’s theory among the few classic attempts in modern times to state
the case for liberty and equality, and thought his achievement in relating the &dquo;opera-
tive ideals&dquo; of democracy to the Industrial Revolution and the rise of nationalism to
be outstanding.4 4
These contrasting views suggest the need for further analysis of Lindsay’s
theory. There are two related purposes. One is to suggest that the reason for these
various interpretations arises from a basic deficiency in the theory itself: the theory
is unfinished and ends in ambiguity. This ambiguity, it will be argued, was due to
Lindsay’s somewhat Hegelian idealism that predisposed him to a critical evaluation
of modern industrialism and mass democracy. Given his pessimistic attitude toward
these fundamental trends plus his own romanticized view of early democracy in
simpler societies, he found it difficult to look hopefully upon modern large-scale and
industrialized democracies. In particular he found it difficult to envisage how the
&dquo;mass man&dquo; from whom democratic controls must basically stem could form the
popular foundation of the modern state. He promised a second volume to follow his
major work, The Modern Democratic State, to deal with &dquo;democratic controls&dquo;;
but it never appeared, though he lived almost a decade thereafter.
In tracking down this key difficulty in Lindsay’s theory a second related pur-
pose will be served, that is, the partial testing of a theory of democracy. One of
the common criticisms today leveled at the traditional treatment of political theory
is its historicism. Theory is treated primarily as an aspect of the past with, at best,
secondary concern for the present. However, more than Easton allows, Lindsay did
develop a theory, even if &dquo;unfinished,&dquo; of modern democracy. His trouble stems less
from his method than from certain conceptions of modern realities that he could not
adapt his theory to meet. Lindsay was indeed passing judgment on the present-day
1 Ernest Barker, "A Philosopher of Democracy," Spectator, 170 (February 26, 1943), 200.
Times (London), March 19, 1952, p. 6, contains an obituary that summarizes Lindsay’s
life.
2 David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 259.
3 
"Democracy Restated," Times Literary Supplement, 42 (February 27, 1943), 98.
’ Preface to the American edition of Lindsay’s The Modern Democratic State, Vol. 1 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947). Hereafter this book is referred to simply as MDS.
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world and incorporating these judgments in his theory, and in this regard escapes
much of the weakness behaviorists charge against the more traditional political
theory. For this reason he offers a valuable example of theory that can be tested in
some degree by reference to recent studies of the actual behavior of modern man.
To claim to test such a theory and one which is &dquo;normative&dquo; raises a further
question. For this Puritan prophet of democracy generalized about and passed
judgment upon whole historical periods. Testing such a theory, therefore, can hardly
mean offering any final or conclusive proof or disproof of his statements. Still, one
may examine an author’s assumptions and the coherence and completeness of his
theory. One may also question the evidence adduced, point to conflicting evidence,
and suggest further lines of inquiry to validate or invalidate the conclusions offered.
Further, it is possible to suggest the relevance of the evidence offered to the norms
proposed and the possible need for revised norms. The exact relation of norms to
questions of fact and logic is hardly within the scope of this paper; but that there
is ample precedent for the relating of norms to behavioral studies is well established
in the literature of recent political science and sociology.5 The purposes of this
analysis will therefore be to point out the weakness of Lindsay’s theory that led to
conflicting estimates, and to test his theory and its assumptions against some conflict-
ing evidence. The conclusion will be that important elements of this idealist’s norms
are in need of revision to meet the requirements for democracy under modern con-
ditions. In the words of E. H. Carr in analyzing the &dquo;new society,&dquo; Lindsay might be
compared with those who look too much behind rather than to &dquo;the shore ahead.&dquo; 6
The examination of Lindsay’s theory will proceed first with an analysis of his
theory of history and of his closely linked conception of the &dquo;modern democratic
state&dquo; to point up the major difficulty to which his ideas led, specifically the problem
of democratic controls. In Lindsay’s &dquo;synoptic vision&dquo; ’ of history he saw the world
divided between two contending forms of individualism, the one idealist and the
other materialist. One form was an individualism rooted in an ideal of freedom and
man’s potentialities for growth and therefore concerned with the dignity and worth
of all men. This idealistic view coupled the quest for freedom with an ingrained
sense of the good of all, both materially and spiritually. The other form was a
secular, atomistic individualism motivated in everything by self-interest and willing
to manipulate things or people indifferently in the quest for power and material
satisfactions. These two forms of individualism Lindsay called the &dquo;Christian&dquo; and
5 Among examples might be cited Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1959). The author documents his claim that leading ex-
ponents of the scientific or behavioral school have implicitly, if not always overtly, ac-
knowledged and upheld values, particularly the norms of a democratic system. Harold
Lasswell, one of those whom Crick cites, has himself written on the subject: "The Norma-
tive Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," Ethics, 67 (1957), 1-42. A commonly cited
example of the conscious relating of social science to democratic norms is in the study
by Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chap. 14. See
also the concluding chapters of Campbell etal., The American Voter (New York: Wiley,
1960). Additionally, there is Robert E. Dahl’s evaluation of models of American democ-
racy in his Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
The work of sociologist Seymour M. Lipset is another good example. See especially the
essays published as Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960).
6 E. H. Carr, The New Society (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 5.
7 The term is Barker’s. See op. cit., p. 200.
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the &dquo;scientific&dquo; ;8 and it was the clash between these two fundamentally opposed
views that he saw manifest in World War II. Democracy and its &dquo;Christian&dquo; individ-
ualism were ranged against a scientific or &dquo;economic man&dquo; philosophy linked with
totalitarianism.
Historically the conflict began in the contrasting views represented by the prac-
tice of the democratically governed Puritan congregations, on the one hand, and
the authoritarian ideas of Hobbes, on the other.9 This latter form of individualism
Lindsay further related to a long Utilitarian tradition transmitted after Hobbes by
the Benthamites and by Marx’s materialist &dquo;economic man&dquo; philosophy.10 In actual
application this same materialist and utilitarian philosophy was manifest in the one-
sided development of science and industry.&dquo; The growth of technological powers
enabled man to manipulate the material environment as never before; and the quest
for the benefits unleashed by this power led to a growing material revolution culmi-
nating in the still-continuing Industrial Revolution. But man’s self-mastery and
hence his mastery of social and political affairs lagged behind his power to manipu-
late things. &dquo;Technical progress means progress in instruments, in the means or
power of achieving our ends.... But when technical progress gets ahead of political
and social organization - as since the Industrial Revolution it has - it may so
dominate society that it becomes a master instead of a servant....&dquo; For Lindsay
the advance of technology represented by the expanding industrialization of the
globe was a &dquo;material revolution without a corresponding moral and spiritual revo-
lution.&dquo; A mounting crisis was thus born that Lindsay saw at a peak in World
War II. By the twentieth century industrialization had created soulless, army-like
societies in which the mass of men lived routine, mechanical lives dominated by
giant organizations and a hierarchy of impersonal managers. 12 Consequently men
were treated as instruments to be manipulated rather than as beings capable of moral
and spiritual development.
Still, this system was inherently unstable. The trouble lay not with man’s pov-
erty, for the &dquo;grim phase&dquo; of the Industrial Revolution was over by the beginning
of the twentieth century. The trouble went deeper than any economic hardship that
remained. For as long as the insatiable quest for self-aggrandizement prevailed,
social control fluctuated from one extreme to another: laissez faire anarchy or total
planning and control. 13 Egoistic individuals either rejected restraint and free co-
operation altogether or had to be bound together in a scientifically manipulated
system. To be free, men had to recognize restraints on themselves and had to be
willing to contribute to something beyond their own interests - the common good.
Yet the acquisitive economic man philosophy associated with the excessive pace of
8 A. D. Lindsay, "Christian and Scientific Individualism" Dublin Review, 207 (1940), 185.
See also MDS, pp. 77-81, in which these are characterized as "Protestant" and "scien-
tific" individualism.
9 MDS, pp. 117 and 136ff., respectively. In attaching such signal importance to the Puritans,
Lindsay may have been influenced by T. H. Green. See the latter’s "Lectures on the
English Commonwealth" in his Works (London: Longmans, Green, 1889), Vol. 3.
10 MDS, pp. 84, 140ff.
11 Ibid., pp. 78-81.
12 Ibid., pp. 177-90.
13 Ibid., p. 144.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
801
technology threatened this public-spirited outlook. The same materialistic self-seek-
ing that was the inner motivation of totalitarianism and attacked democracy from
without threatened to disrupt democracy from within. Nationalism and the workers’
movement countered the damaging influence of industrialism in some degree but
could not of themselves fully restore the community.14 With this generations-old
crisis mounting to the possibilities of world-wide devastation by war, the &dquo;operative
ideals&dquo; of democracy needed restatement. How could the democratic state, as the
political expression of the value of all human kind, regain control over the forces
that threatened to enslave and destroy men? Lindsay wanted to revive and adapt
to twentieth-century industrial societies the &dquo;spiritual&dquo; individualism and democracy
of the early Puritan congregations.
On this interpretation of world history and its conflicts, Lindsay’s socialism was
not to be a secular creed of class war and the abolition of private property. 15 His
socialism was based on idealism, not Marxist materialism. Nor could he believe that
an unrestrained competitive individualism naturally produced results beneficial to
all without political direction.16 Politics had to control economics to insure the
dominance of men’s better purposes and ideals. The goal was the good society, an
ideal of humane and decent living for all. Economically it would be one which in-
sured a national minimum of material well-being to all and restrained the irresponsi-
ble power of great economic organizations, if need be by nationalization. 17 Morally
its objective would be to provide an almost mystical sense of fellowship and of be-
longing. 18 Lindsay’s socialism was a peculiar combination. He contemplated a pro-
found change in the social system eventually but thought in terms of human nature
rather than the extension of state controls. He idealized the British labor move-
ment as the embodiment of democratic theory and practice and looked to it to lead
present-day society gradually toward the socialist way of life. His socialism was even
so moderate that Laski accused him of &dquo;failing to face the central issue of property
14 Ibid., pp. 163-65 and 190-92.
15 Lindsay did pass through a phase marked by some sympathy for Marxism. But this phase
ended by the thirties. See Preface to the 1935 edition of The Essentials of Democracy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1951). And in any case his sympathetic treatment
of Marx in his Karl Marx’s Capital, published in 1925, was such that Adam Ulam later
said, "Marx emerges, on the whole ... curiously similar to Green." See A. B. Ulam,
Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1951), p. 101.
16 Of Lindsay’s attitude towards capitalism Ulam writes, "Capitalism and its theoretical back-
bone &mdash; laissez f aire and old liberalism &mdash; do not get a hearing before Lindsay." See
Ulam, op. cit., p. 102. Lindsay’s deep suspicion of the unregulated economy is well con-
veyed by a remark he once made in praise of Hegel. "Hegel," Lindsay claimed, "is the
first political philosopher to acknowledge the independent importance in the State of
economic relations and of economic law and yet to show how, while remaining relatively
independent, the Economic Community plays its part in the whole and is ’brought back’
by the action of the State to serve the general good." See "Hegel the German Idealist"
in Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Age of Reaction and
Reconstruction, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), p. 66.
17 A. D. Lindsay, "The Philosophy of the British Labour Government" in William Ebenstein,
Great Political Thinkers (3rd ed.; New York: Rinehart, 1960), p. 800.
18 Ibid., p. 805. Ulam describes the "quality pervading the thinking of Lindsay, and of many
other theoreticians of the Labour Party" as a "religious semi-mystic one: the citizens of
a modern democracy need to be innoculated by what they call the common life." See
op. cit., p. 117.
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and the problems of power to which its relations gives rise.&dquo; ~9 What Lindsay wanted
to change was the acquisitive materialistic motivation that he felt was the basis of
capitalism and the prime fault of the social system. The ideal socialist society was
one in which men worked, not for their own interests, but for the good of all, and
thereby fulfilled their potentialities as individuals. Socialism in this manner he re-
garded as simply an extension of the older principles of democracy: &dquo;the modern
democratic state’s concern with industrial and economic conditions is but the logical
extension of the principle that the state’s business is to maintain a system of rights.&dquo;
Politically the system would be one in which the individual conscience was the
&dquo;absolute authority.&dquo; 20 This did not mean that each man had his own way or would
even want to, but that the political order recognized the worth and dignity of each
man, encouraged him to participate in the common life, and accepted the com-
munity as the rightful regulator of the state. For the individual this position brought
independent freedom as a democratic citizen; but he also had the responsibility to
participate and to form his judgments by reference to the common good, not his own
selfish interests. Granted the interdependence of modern societies, men had to be
able to work together spontaneously if they were to be free. Otherwise there would
be one exteme or the other: anarchy or scientific manipulation and control. In
Lindsay’s apt phrase, &dquo;no amount of manipulation will make a multitude of egoists
capable of government.&dquo; At the base of democracy, therefore, was an assumption,
not only of a tradition of freedom, but also a spirit of good will and cooperativeness.
The &dquo;economic man&dquo; of totalitarianism and the aberrations of democracy was not
capable of sustained freedom.
Upon these principles Lindsay built his notion of a constitutional democratic
state. His most serious difficulty was to explain how individuals organized in the
gigantic modern nation could be said to consent to the acts of a large and powerful
government, a government which they obviously had no immediate role in assenting
to or in directing. Although the answer was complex and, in the end, incomplete,
he stated important principles.
In the first place, any democratic system was pluralistic and made up of many
voluntary associations based on spontaneous and uncoerced activity.21 There was
much that democratic citizens did of a private and semi-public nature which the
state did not and should not regulate. Furthermore, so far as the state did regulate
conduct, it laid down laws which most people willingly obeyed most of the time.
Those laws it did enforce and thereby left the citizens no choice to obey had a special
urgency as essential to the freedoms of a11.22 Yet all of these provisions were chiefly
negative. They did not explain how individual citizens could be said to participate
in and consent to state activity. To meet this problem Lindsay drew upon the idea
of the general will. The original form of this concept he drew from the practice of
19 H. J. Laski, "Modern Democracy," Manchester Guardian, March 3, 1943, p. 3.
20MDS, p. 231.
21 Ibid., pp. 265-66. Lindsay passed through a phase of pluralism in his intellectual develop-
ment and was so classified by F. W. Coker in his Recent Political Thought (New York:
Appleton-Century, 1934), p. 497.
22 MDS, pp. 207ff.
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the Puritan congregations, but in application to modern societies he relied upon the
form given it by Rousseau and Bernard Bosanquet, especially the latter.23
The modern democratic state, Lindsay argued, was governed by a spirit which
bound leaders and ordinary citizens in a common will. There was, to begin with,
a traditional consensus of values and aspirations developed by national experience as
one people. For the &dquo;important thing about the successful democratic nation states
is ... in their citizens having the same political hopes and aspirations....&dquo; Added to
this consensus, which itself limited what leaders might do and provided a sense of
national direction, was the public discussion, with the leaders themselves playing a
prominent part, and which created a spirit or sense of what the public wanted.24
It was the duty of the leaders chosen by the public to formulate and apply policies
in accord with this &dquo;will&dquo; to make the community &dquo;more of a community.&dquo; 25 A
state guided in this manner could be said to be governed by a general will. There
was a consensus to which public discussion added specifics so that the resulting &dquo;sense
of the community&dquo; to a very real degree guided the conduct of statesmen and admin-
istrators in the formulation of policies. The conception was one of the &dquo;deliberative
state&dquo; consciously creating social harmony by means of adjustment, discussion, and
cooperation.26 The &dquo;sovereignty&dquo; of the general will reconciled the more ultimate
sovereignty of the individual conscience with the vast twentieth-century state and its
elite of statesmen and administrators.
But Lindsay himself admitted the account of the modern democratic state was
not complete. Up to this point he had relied heavily on Bosanquet’s idealist theory
of the state and felt the need to go beyond. The particular problem was the matter
of democratic controls. And it was at this point that the greatest weakness in Lind-
say’s theory appeared.
Modern societies were enormous by comparison with the early agricultural so-
cieties in which democracy seemed a natural way of conducting affairs. Industrial-
ization and its material benefits lured men on to achievements that threatened to
overwhelm the seeming master. The cleavage between management and worker
was great; and industrialization constantly reinforced an hierarchical and undemo-
cratic form of organization. Concentrations of economic power grew apace and the
state was hard put to control not only the industrial obligarchy but also the military
forces at its disposal, and the civilian bureaucracy. Life for the great mass of men
in this army-like industrial system was routine and mechanical to an extent that
23 Ibid., pp. 235ff. Some years earlier Lindsay had criticized the concept of the general will
in Rousseau and Bosanquet because of its absolutist implications. See his essay "Abso-
lutism" in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1 (New York, 1930), 381; and also his
more extended criticism of Bosanquet, "Bosanquet’s Theory of the General Will," Aristo-
telian Society Supplement, 8 ( 1928), 31-44.
24 Lindsay referred briefly (p. 246) to Ernest Barker’s then-recent exposition of "government
by discussion" in Reflections on Government. Lindsay’s idealist terminology perhaps
somewhat obscured the importance he attached to discussion. In an earlier exposition
of his ideas he gave as the "main thesis of these lectures ... that discussion is fundamental
to democracy...." The Essentials of Democracy, p. 1. The book appeared originally
in 1929.
25 MDS, pp. 245ff.
26 John Chapman, Rousseau&mdash;Totalitarian or Liberal? (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1956), p. 136.
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wasted men’s souls and frustrated their potentialities for development. The &dquo;plain
man&dquo; to whom democracy gave a share in government by granting him the vote and
liberty to express his opinions was hardly capable of exercising his proper role.
Industrialism so affectcd the great mass of men that there was a serious question
whether they had the qualities of wisdom and judgment necessary in choosing be-
tween competing policies and leaders.
Running counter to these baneful excesses of science and industrialism was the
working-class movement. In England this movement gradually took the form of
strong and cohesive trade unions with related cooperatives, friendly societies, and
working-men’s clubs. The working-class movements, not only in England but also
in Europe and even in non-Western countries such as Japan and India, Lindsay
regarded as the &dquo;most lively defenders of democracy. 11 27 Unfortunately he did not
regard this movement as sufficient. His major work, published during World War II,
concluded with a predominantly pessimistic assessment of the &dquo;wisdom of the plain
man.&dquo; 28 He expressed his sympathy for those notable critics of mass democracy,
De Tocqueville and Ortega y Gasset, and promised a second volume to deal with
the &dquo;problems of democratic controls.&dquo; Totalitarianism threatened democracy from
without and mobocracy from within.
In the postwar years Lindsay turned to an exposition of the &dquo;Philosophy of the
British Labour Government.&dquo; He admitted that nationalization made industry re-
sponsible to society but still felt that oligarchic relationships persisted within indus-
try. A hierarchy was present in which a relatively few managed the work of many.
Democratic socialism overcame the economic evils of industrialism and partially re-
solved the problem of power in bringing industry under society’s control. Nonethe-
less, Lindsay thought a true Christian community of participants in the common
life was lacking and the language of democracy in speaking of consent and the will
of the people was &dquo;mythical.’ 1 29 In the end he seemed to see the democratic socialist
society of postwar England as a political system that paid homage to democratic
ideals but did not actually realize them.
Lindsay’s theorizing ends with this somewhat bleak reference to democracy as
&dquo;myth&dquo; and without the promised full treatment of democratic controls. No wonder
reviewers of the earlier work reached discrepant conclusions, though each states a
partial truth. Lindsay was, as Barker described him, a Puritan prophet in the sense
that he did have a deeply historical outlook that saw men’s destiny in modern times
worked out in the contending individualisms of science and Christianity. Far more
than most moderns, he did, as Elliott noted, develop a theory on classic lines that
traced the relation of democracy to the Industrial Revolution and the growth of
nationalism. More than David Easton allows, Lindsay’s theory bears on contempo-
27 MDS, p. 192.
28 Ibid., pp. 280ff.
29 See Ebenstein’s Great Political Thinkers, pp. 803-7. Of course Lindsay has been neither first
nor alone in using the term "myth." See Ben Halpern, " ’Myth’ and ’Ideology’ in Modern
Usage," History and Theory, 1 (1961), 129-49. C. W. Cassinelli, in his analysis of the
principal features of democratic states, devotes a chapter to myths as "indispensable over-
simplifications." See his The Politics of Freedom (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1961), chap. 7.
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rary problems of democracy and is not simply historical.3° Most pertinent of all was
the anonymous reviewer who thought Lindsay’s unfinished theory bore some com-
parison with earlier aristocratic regimes in which mass participation was lacking.
Certainly Lindsay did not accept the eighteenth-century solution, but his difficulties
in treating democratic controls lent itself to this criticism.
Above all, however, one should recognize that Lindsay’s theory is fully and
even poignantly modern in its treatment of power. His fundamental concern is with
power as evidenced in the excessive influence of science and technology. He saw the
threat as one both within and without the democratic system in the form of collective
aggregates of power created by modern conditions. Laski was absolutely right in say-
ing that Lindsay, a fellow socialist, neglected the problem of property relationships.
To the idealist, the basic social division was not one between &dquo;the rich and the poor&dquo;
but between &dquo;those who manage and control ... and those who are managed and
controlled....&dquo; 3’- Like Hegel, the twentieth-century Englishman profoundly sus-
pected the acquisitive society and wanted state control. But the main point for both
idealists was to assert a moral or spiritual control of society rather than a concern
with a specific form of economic system. Much more than Hegel, Lindsay wanted
to democratize the control by the state. Or, in broader terms, he wanted modern
man’s enormous powers subordinated to a moral ideal in a community of genuine
fellowship. Yet like so many moderns, Lindsay thought man’s technical ability to do
things outran his moral capacities. The powers man created also threatened to
destroy man for lack of effective moral guidance and restraint. There is an under-
tone of pathos and potential tragedy that well forebodes the arms race of the cold
war and its frightening weapons. The problem of democratic controls was of a piece
with this outlook. And although his postwar writings seemed less pessimistic, his
final description of democratic socialism as in the utopian or &dquo;myth&dquo; stage of de-
velopment pointed up his dilemma and continuing doubts.
Lindsay faced a serious problem and his doubts about the future of democracy
are similar to those of a whole school of latter-day critics of mass democracy, indus-
trialism, and urbanism.32 Still, for all the support one might muster for Lindsay’s
views, there is another side, too. From a variety of sources one can gather evidence
that the strains of modern society do not appear, on close examination, to be so
devastating as to overthrow democracy from within. And in some respects there is
reason to believe that moderns have more freedom today than ever before. A second
line of criticism will question Lindsay’s norms of a democratic system. For the reali-
30 References to Lindsay crop up here and there in contemporary literature. Though brief,
these references do illustrate the point that he is both read and applied to contemporary
problems. A partial list might include: Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1959), p. 345; H. Mark Roelof, The Tension of Citizenship (New York: Rinehart,
1957), pp. xvff; Neal Riemer, The Revival of Democratic Theory (New York: Appleton-
Century Crofts, 1962), p. 71; Cassinelli, op. cit., p. 94, n. 13. In W. H. Chambers and
R. H. Salisbury (eds.), Democracy in Mid-Twentieth Century (St. Louis: Washington
University Press, 1960), Leon D. Epstein cites Lindsay’s position specifically as an "ortho-
dox contemporary answer" to the problems of public control of foreign policy (p. 133).
31 MDS, p. 184.
32 Daniel Bell, in The End of Ideology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), presents a classification of
the various types of critics of mass society (p. 27). Winston White in Beyond Conformity
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), discusses and classifies American commentators on the
trends toward loss of individualism and surrender to conformity.
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ties of large-scale and impersonal societies strongly urge the view that the kind of
cohesive, participant, and &dquo;comradely&dquo; system Lindsay preferred is quite unwork-
able. Whatever alternative democratic norms may be thought feasible, it can be
argued that Lindsay’s democratic system is not. As explained earlier, this testing can
not be conclusive but can raise questions as to Lindsay’s assumptions and inferences
and point to new directions in which it would appear to be more profitable in the
age of &dquo;the new society&dquo; to develop democratic theory.
In turning to criticism, then, one might first question Lindsay’s misgivings as to
industrialization. In the world of the 1960’s it would seem that people everywhere
want to industrialize. In the still tradition-dominated societies where the stress of
change is likely to be greatest and misgivings most justified, the main question seems
to be not if but only how fast and in what manner industrialization can proceed.
Much of this impulse to change is well summarized by C. P. Snow in explaining
what he considers the &dquo;primary gains&dquo; of the Industrial Revolution: &dquo;Enough to
eat.... Everyone able to read and write because an industrial society won’t work
without. Health, food, education, nothing but the industrial revolution could have
spread them right down to the very poor.&dquo; 33 At the other end of the world scale of
industrial development, the nations of North America and much of Western Europe
have been described as &dquo;affluent societies.&dquo; In these societies the &dquo;good life&dquo; in a
material sense is increasingly available to large numbers of the population. If these
summary generalizations be true one can say of much of the modem attitude toward
industrialization that those who have it are thought of as &dquo;afluent&dquo; and those who
lack it want to industrialize to gain similar benefits. Lindsay himself recognized im-
portant material gains brought on by industrialization but on balance regarded it
with suspicion.34 According to Adam Ulam, the prejudice that Lindsay shares with
other idealists is such that &dquo;the philosophy of idealism does not escape the nostalgic
note of a certain resentment against the industrial society where bigness and purely
technical accomplishment can become conditions of survival.&dquo; 35 Industrialization
and the desire for its material benefits in Lindsay’s scale of values were decidedly
on the lesser, grubby side of life.
That the process need not be as politically unpleasant as the idealist was apt
to think is partially borne out by the investigations of two American sociologists,
William Komhauser and S. M. Lipset. Kornhauser has examined the effects of
mass democracy, industrialization, and urbanism and concludes that these pervasive
changes need not in themselves cause discontinuities and extremist movements.36
Where these changes occur slowly and the community has time to adjust to them
the system is not permanently unsettled. The changes acquire &dquo;legitimacy&dquo; and are
accepted to become a feature of an altered but stable system. Where changes take
place rapidly and cause serious discontinuities in the social fabric and political sys-
tem, then extremist movements acquire strength and totalitarianism becomes a
threat.
33 The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1960),p.26.
34 MDS, chap. 7.
35 Ulam, op. cit., p. 119.
36 The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 173-74.
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S. M. Lipset reached similar conclusions from similar evidence. He has written:
&dquo;Wherever industrialization occurred rapidly, introducing sharp discontinuities be-
tween the pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist
working-class movements emerged.&dquo; 37 If the system can accommodate itself to new
demands, such as workers’ legislation, and at the same time preserve a sense of legiti-
macy among conservatives, then a stable transition may occur. The point is that pro-
found changes, such as industrialization and the emergence of the working class
politically, can occur and have occurred, to become accepted as part of the system.
And he notes &dquo;the absurd fact that ten out of the twelve stable European and Eng-
lish-speaking democracies are monarchies.&dquo; Conservatives by and large become rec-
onciled to much of modern political and social equality and the disagreement that
remains poses no basic threat to the system. From this evidence there is reason to
question Lindsay’s sweeping tendency to link industrial change with an antidemo-
cratic political propensity. There may and have been such linkages but by no means
necessarily. In particular it is difficult to look upon the prosperous and increasingly
united Europe of the 1960’s as rent by the excesses of industrialism.
Pushing this point further there is the commonly noted fact that, contrary to
Marx’s predictions, the most highly industrialized countries have proved most re-
sistant to the Marxist socialism and its twentieth-century concomitant of Communist
control. The stresses and strains of industrialism pose their own problems and may
bring conservative opposition as the industrial benefits are spread by measures to
foster political and social equality. Yet not to develop a society’s economic base,
of which industrialism is today the main form, leaves the system vulnerable to revolu-
tion from the left. C. W. Cassinelli elaborates this position by arguing not only that
democracy rests on the foundation of a &dquo;Middle Class society.&dquo; He also argues that
democracies in their nature follow social welfare policies. He maintains this feature
arises from the dynamics of the electoral process that are distinctive to representa-
tive systems and not shared with other nondemocratic systems.3$ Although this posi-
tion itself raises questions that require a fuller analysis than Cassinelli offers, it illus-
trates an attitude different from Lindsay’s spiritualized conception of socialism.
Lindsay’s &dquo;spiritualized&dquo; and almost religious socialism could not but look with
some foreboding at the heavy stress placed on industrialism and its associated ma-
terial benefits in twentieth-century societies.
A further major criticism of Lindsay’s interpretation of industrialism is his view
of the plight of the &dquo;plain man&dquo; in urban, industrial societies. Even granting the
saving influences of the worker’s movement to check the excesses of a &dquo;scientific in-
dividualism,&dquo; Lindsay did not regard the ordinary man’s lot as an attractive one.
Like other critics of mass society he inclined to see this &dquo;plain man&dquo; as tending to be
alienated and anomic within the pyramidal hierarchies of state and industrial system.
There is here, too, some evidence to the contrary. One important piece of
evidence is from Key’s analysis of American public opinion and &dquo;Morale in the
Industrial Order.&dquo; According to Key, &dquo;Remarkably little variation existed in the
outlook of different occupational groups.... Prospects for getting ahead looked less
37 Political Man, p. 68. Emphasis in original.
38 Cassinelli, op. cit., chap. 3.
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rosy to the unskilled worker than to the businessman; yet few of either group were
so gloomy as to see no opportunity for the average man.&dquo; 39 A poll in 1956 by the
Michigan Center adds to the evidence. Key remarks that although 50 per cent of
the unskilled workers expected their situation to stay the same, &dquo;the data suggest the
presence of fairly widespread satisfaction....&dquo; Another piece of evidence comes
from Scott Greer’s survey of a number of studies of American city-dwellers. He con-
cluded that the life of these urbanites was not ideal but that &dquo;the picture is less
frightening than that of the atomistic man adrift in mass society, anomic and de-
structive.&dquo; ‘~° The American urbanite is not the perfect citizen, but most achieve a
tolerable adjustment that keeps them from being alienated. A recent addition to the
evidence is the report of a poll by George Gallup in the summer of 1962. When his
pollsters asked people whether they thought &dquo;life for people generally will get better
- or will get worse?&dquo; there were 55 per cent willing to say life would get better and
only 23 per cent to affirm that it would get worse .41 In part this poll reflected a short-
term movement since the Korean War when the replies were less optimistic; but
neither this poll nor the other evidence cited goes far to prove that the modern
American is in the condition Lindsay pictured for the &dquo;plain man.&dquo; There are strains
and frustrations but most Americans do not appear to be dangerously dissatisfied
and alienated.
Closely linked with the question of alienation is that as to the freedom of the
ordinary man. For Lindsay, as for the other critics of mass society, highly indus-
trialized and urbanized systems tend in a variety of ways to foster conformity and
frustration of opportunities for personal development. In contrast to this point of
view there are a number of observers who argue that freedom is not lost and is even
in some ways expanded. John Roche has argued this case in an examination of the
&dquo;American tradition of freedom.&dquo; In the old days of pre-industrial America, free-
dom was, he maintains, a by-product of separation and isolation. Today, by con-
trast, freedom has become a conscious national goal protected in a variety of ways.
The anonymity of large urban centers protects the individual from prying and inter-
ference in a cloak of indifference. Further, the law profession today in courts, gov-
ernment, and private practice is much more aware of the importance of the protec-
tions embodied in due process. And there are civic groups, such as the American
Civil Liberties Union, which do yoeman’s work in safeguarding individual rights.
He sums up his case by writing: &dquo;To put it a little too neatly, in rural America, free-
dom was a function of openness, of the individual’s ability to get out of an oppressive
environment; in urban America, freedom is a function of impersonalization, of the
growth of legal and political institutions which muffle interpersonal and intergroup
conflicts.&dquo; 42
39 V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp.
127-30. For related evidence on the U.S. &mdash; and elsewhere &mdash; see the UNESCO survey
taken in 1948 and published by William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations
See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953).
40 Scott Greer, "Individual Participation in Mass Society," in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches
to the Study of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 342.
41 Houston Post, August 30, 1962, p. 8, section 5.
42 John Roche, "American Liberty: An Examination of the Tradition of Freedom," in Milton
Konvitz and Clinton Rossiter (eds.), Aspects of Liberty (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1958), p. 151.
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Supplementing this line of argument is evidence from a volume of essays re-
evaluating the ideas of David Riesman on conformity in present-day America. In
one of the critiques, S. M. Lipset argues that American character has not changed
much since De Tocqueville wrote. Long ago in De Tocqueville’s time, Americans
had a mobile, egalitarian, and status-conscious culture and have today as well. But
there has also always been, and still is, Lipset argues, a competitive, achievement-
oriented system of values with many opportunities for individualism. According to
Lipset, some of the very characteristics that contribute to other-directedness and
conformity, such as urbanism and bureaucratization in a fluid, mobile society, may
also nourish a hard-driving competitive ethic and provide avenues for the exercise
of choice not present earlier.43 Among these he cites the decline of family firms and
the growth of bureaucracies within which advancement depends more on perform-
ance than on having the right friends and relations. The area of arbitrary whim is
reduced by the bureaucracy and its restraints, and an ethos of hard work is spread
among &dquo;non-owners&dquo; who may now advance in accord with performance. Addi-
tionally, and like Roche, Lipset also believes that with the growth of cities there has
been a decline in the small-town and rural-area type of life with their comparatively
rigid status systems and narrow round of existence. In urban life, on the other hand,
relations are more impersonal and for this reason conformity may be more &dquo;out-
ward&dquo; and less &dquo;inward.&dquo; On this last Lipset quotes Clyde Kluckhohn’s assessment:
&dquo;If one accepts outwardly the conventions of one’s group, one may have greater
psychic energy to develop and fulfill one’s private potentialities as a unique person.
I have encountered no substantial evidence that this ’conformity’ is thorough-goingly
’inward.’ &dquo; 44 And Lipset adds, &dquo;As status seeking is the by-product of strong equali-
tarianism, so conformity may permit, or even demand, inner autonomy.&dquo;
Even Riesman seems willing to modify his position a bit. In a reconsideration
of &dquo;autonomy&dquo; he discards leisure as a creative personalized focus for energies stifled
by work and confesses that he minimized the objective pressures making work harder
for the profesional and managerial strata while the hours of work were reduced and
grim conditions were being mitigated for lower-status occupations. Most impor-
tantly, Riesman now appears willing to look more favorably than before upon the
prospects for an increase in autonomy. Thus, &dquo;the loss of older fixed boundaries of
class, caste, and nation does not inevitably mean a growing sameness in the world in
terms of the development of personal styles of life.&dquo; The decline of the old barriers
of nation and class may permit new forms of association that could foster variety
and differences. Riesman is far from optimistic but appears more hopeful than in
the past.45
43 S. M. Lipset, "A Changing American Character?" in S. M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (eds.),
Culture and Social Character: The Work of David Riesman Revisited (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1961), pp. 166ff.
44 See also Clyde Kluckhohn’s review article, "Shifts in American Values," World Politics, 11 
( 1959), 250-61. Daniel Lerner attacks the critics of mass society and the organization
man by speculating on the historical evolution of an "empathetic personality" that is
functionally necessary to a physically and socially mobile society. See his "Comfort and
Fun: Morality in a Nice Society," American Scholar (Spring 1958), pp. 153-65. See
also Winston White, Beyond Conformity, chaps. 6, 7, and 8 on "An Alternative View."
45 "The Lonely Crowd: A Reconsideration in 1960," in Lipset and Lowenthal, op. cit., pp.
456-58.
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Of course these remarks do not mean that the modern American or European
leads an ideal existence. The evidence suggests hopeful trends but is certainly in-
complete. In the end, the most balanced assessment to set against Lindsay and other
critics of mass society would be that of De Tocqueville. For all of the latter’s criti-
cism of the course of early American democracy, he saw benefits too. Some forms
of individualism, particularly that enjoyed by the aristocrat in nineteenth-century
Europe, had declined then as later. And unquestionably the &dquo;freedom from&dquo; enjoyed
by the upper-class European and probably also by his counterpart in America must
have been remarkable in the days before the welfare state imposed its burdens and
restraints. But as De Tocqueville also noted in recording this loss, there was a great
gain for the mass of men. A state of equality was &dquo;less elevated ... but more just.&dquo; 46
With the further advance of social and political equality brought by mid-twentieth
century, the &dquo;plain man&dquo; of much of Western society has achieved large-scale bene-
fits. The spread of education, the rise of incomes, the reduction of working hours
and the choice of activities for work and recreation made available on a mass scale
in urban, industrial societies all have conjoined to spread remarkable benefits in the
mass democracies. In these circumstances De Tocqueville - and Lindsay - are
right in seeing some loss of a &dquo;freedom from&dquo; for those who were advantageously
placed in nineteenth-century societies. But De Tocqueville, more than Lindsay,
was willing to recognize the gains for the mass of men, gains much more evident in
the middle of the twentieth century. This balancing of the scales by one whom
Lindsay himself cited is perhaps the best reply possible to the Englishman’s picture of
the plight of the &dquo;plain man.&dquo;
A last commentary on Lindsay’s attitude toward industralism and the changes
it has wrought pertains to the relative weight to be assigned to the internal dangers
from this quarter. It is true that his wide-ranging philosophy dealt with the dangers
of nationalism and the totalitarian powers, both fascist and communist. But the
over-all effect was to give little attention to the distinctive problems of the inter-
national arena. And it is here that the &dquo;excesses&dquo; of science in creating terrible new
weapons of war are most evident. For Lindsay, the entire international sector was
compressed and reduced largely to a manifestation of the dangers of a selfish individ-
ualism. The resulting political philosophy was one-sided. As Adam Ulam remarks,
Lindsay &dquo;reproduces unconsciously the frame of mind which was a legacy from the
days of England’s undoubted supremacy in the world....&dquo; 47 When England’s posi-
tion changed to become more precarious, Lindsay’s thought was still focused chiefly
on internal problems or saw international turmoil as largely a further form of in-
ternal social stress.
Apart from Lindsay’s attitude toward industrialism there is another category
of possible criticisms that pertains to Lindsay’s idealized version of the prevailing
spirit of a democracy. His original ideal of democracy went back to the days prior
to the Industrial Revolution when the early Puritans developed their democratic
practices and &dquo;the simple agricultural society ... in countries like Switzerland or
46 Democracy in America, "The World’s Classics," ed. and with intro. by Henry Steele Com-
mager (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 597.
47 Op. cit., p. 119.
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Norway or New England made democracy an obvious form of government.&dquo; 48 In
these small, cohesive societies, participation presented no overwhelming problems.
It is true that Lindsay sought to emphasize not so much the actual counting of heads
but rather the participation of each in an accepted sense of common will and pur-
pose. At its best democracy certainly did not mean the clamorous assembly with each
taking part equally. It is also true that he saw some distinctive problems created by
the sheer size of modern systems; he recognized full well the need for an elite, cast
doubt upon the wisdom of the plain man, and stressed the problem of size in modem
democracies. Still, he seemed to think in terms of some manner of highly personal
and unique kind of participation. For this reason he saw the need to revise his model
of democracy based on the early Puritans and turned first to Rousseau but above all
to Bosanquet. In the latter he thought he found a conception of the spirit of demo-
cratic participation adaptable to the nation-state. He wanted the &dquo;spirit of the
common life&dquo; to be the &dquo;sovereign principle&dquo; to guide legislation and have authority
over the individual. He wanted in politics a spirit Adam Ulam describes as a &dquo;reli-
gious, semi-mystic one: the citizens of modem democracy need to be inoculated by
what they [Lindsay and other Labour party theorists] call the common life.&dquo; 49
Against this ideal one must set the realities of mass participation. The argument will
be that his ideal of twentieth-century democracy retained the flavor of a small,
cohesive, participating community that is quite unrealistic today.
To begin with, there is the evidence from electoral studies. The well-known
study of &dquo;The Political Activity of American Citizens&dquo; by Woodward and Roper con-
cluded in 1950 that only one-quarter of the adult population could be considered
&dquo;active&dquo; and the other three-quarters &dquo;inactive&dquo; or &dquo;very inactive.&dquo; 50 More re-
cently, that comprehensive study of American electoral behavior, The American
Voter, found the theme to which its authors must return repeatedly to be &dquo;the low
emotional involvement of the electorate in politics, its slight awareness of public
affairs, its failure to think in structured ideological terms; and its pervasive sense
of attachment to one or the other of two major parties.&dquo; 51 Nor do other voting
studies find substantial disagreement. The American public is not much involved
politically and the ordinary voter is not likely to give much attention to politics so as
to know the issues and candidates well.
Supplementing these studies of electoral behavior are those on public opinion.
V. O. Key’s assessment of American public opinion casts serious doubt on the con-
ception of an ideological consensus underlying the political system: &dquo;Whatever the
characteristics of popular attitude that permit governments to operate as if a basic
consensus existed, they do not seem to consist of ideas that amount to a consensus on
political fundamentals unless we mean by that phrase nothing more than a popular
recognition of the legitimacy of the regime.&dquo; 52 Nor is there a &dquo;majority will&dquo; that
can be said to characterize the great mass of the population on specific issues of the
48 MDS, p. 192.
49 Op. cit., p. 117.
50 Reprinted in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (eds.), Political Be-
havior (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), pp. 133-37.
51 Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 541.
52 Op. cit., p. 50.
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day. Instead, Key believes there is a &dquo;concentration&dquo; of opinion in an &dquo;attentive
public&dquo; that is probably no more than one-fifth of the electorate and on many issues
apt to be less.53 Most of the public at large seems to lack a sense of agreed ideology
underlying the system and to be unconcerned with most of the political issues of the
day that the attentive group does heed. In a very real sense public opinion is the
opinion of a minority.
Apart from politics, what of participation in other kinds of organized social life?
Americans have a reputation as &dquo;joiners&dquo; and there are numberless associations of
all kinds throughout the American scene. Bernard Barber has taken a long look at
this reputation and concludes that the reality is one of limited participation. He
finds there are countless associations but that most people belong to none and that
the associations themselves are run by a small number of actives. Mass participation
does not exist.5~ Seymour Lipset reaches a similar conclusion from his study of trade
unions. He concludes that the requirements of the organization foster bureaucracy
with an entrenched leadership or oligarchy. He sums up with this claim: &dquo;The
obvious conclusions of this analysis are that the functional requirements for democ-
racy cannot be met most of the time in most unions.&dquo; 55
Beyond these inquiries there is Scott Greer’s previously cited study of the
American urbanite, which specifically concludes that the lives of these people are
&dquo;privitized.&dquo; They do not feel alienated and adrift but they fail to participate in the
life of society. Their round of existence is bounded chiefly by family and relatives
and most of them participate little, or not at all, in politics, occupational associa-
tions, or even in social and recreational organizations.56 For most Americans, life is
lived pretty much in the home and closely related activities. From this data one is
likely to conclude that American society appears to have a secular, atomized quality
consisting of privitized individuals living largely within the bounds of primary
groups. The contrast with Lindsay’s notion of a community mystically united in a
sense of &dquo;common life&dquo; is notable. And it would seem that his democratic norm of
participation, albeit spiritual more than physical, is in the end quite unrealistic. An
ideal drawn originally from much simpler and smaller societies hardly suits the size
and impersonality of nation-states. To try to apply such an ideal in these circum-
stances is apt to lead to the conclusion that democracy is a myth.5’
This review of a Puritan prophet’s theory of democracy has sought, first, to ex-
plain the key ambiguity in his theory that led to the reviewer’s mixed conclusions
and, secondly, to re-evaluate his norms of democracy in light of some recent empiri-
53 Ibid., p. 90.
54 
"Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations" in A. W. Gouldner (ed.), Studies in Leader-
ship (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 481ff. Similarly, E. E. Schattschneider reviews the
literature on pressure groups to conclude that they are limited so as to have a strong upper
class bias and ends with an estimate that "Probably about 90 per cent of the people cannot
get into the pressure system." See The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart, and Winston, 1960), p. 35.
55 Political Man, p. 394.
56 Greer, loc. cit., pp. 331-32.
57 E. E. Schattschneider has put it beautifully: "We become cynical about democracy because
the public does not act the way the simplistic theory of democracy says it should act, or
we try to whip the public into doing things it does not want to do, is unable to do and has
too much sense to do. The crisis here is not a crisis in democracy but a crisis in theory."
Op. cit., p. 134.
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cal findings. It has been argued that the ambiguity in Lindsay’s theory arose from
the failure to complete the spelling out of democratic controls. He was unable to do
so because his idealism distorted his outlook in two respects. For one, it contributed
to a deeply critical conception of the impact of science and industrialism and its
effect on the &dquo;plain man&dquo; upon whom democratic controls must ultimately rely.
Secondly, his idealism was instrumental in forming a norm of democratic community
life that is at odds with secular, impersonal, and large-scale nation-states of the
twentieth century. Admittedly, the evidence cited cannot afford any final proofs.
But this criticism can suggest that the assumptions about the modern world and the
norms of democratic thought expressed by Lindsay are questionable and require
revision to meet modern conditions. The &dquo;new society&dquo; of the twentieth century
does not seem to fit the operative ideals of the modern democratic state laid down
by Lindsay.
In finally evaluating Lindsay’s theory one can well admire his attempt to link
history and political theory in a prophetic vision of man’s moral control over the
changing and turbulent environment of modern times. His theory does convey a real
sense of the widely felt discrepancy between man’s ideals and moral practice, on the
one hand, and the growing technological powers, on the other. Man has trans-
formed his world and continues to increase his material powers, even to the point
of possible self-destruction. And to criticize Lindsay on the problems of community
life in an industrial age is not to deny all significance to these issues. There are,
indeed, serious problems of human adjustment present in coping with the stresses of
industrial society. On these points the idealism strengthens the theory and gives force
to his statement of the challenges of today. Unfortunately, Lindsay carried this
idealism to an unrealistic extent in leaning heavily on an idealized past and in ex-
pressing a fundamental distaste for some of the most characteristic trends of modern
times, with a consequent neglect of the threats arising from the international sector.
The restatement of the operative ideals of democracy must begin with a realistic ac-
commodation to things about the modern world Lindsay could not altogether accept.
As E. H. Carr has written of the transition from individualism to mass democracy
and the new society, one must look &dquo;to the shore ahead,&dquo; not the &dquo;ruins behind.&dquo;
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